

Background Topics 19 Feb 86

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18 February 1986

## ADDI Talking Points for HPSCI

Haiti

- I. Although the new government has restored order and the Army remains a respected institution, General Namphy's government nonetheless faces major obstacles.
  - A. Popular demands include an election timetable and better living conditions.
    1. Unless protests increase in intensity, however, most members of the interim government are unlikely to favor elections before 18 months at the earliest. ✓
    2. In addition, even generous foreign aid would not lead to sustainable economic growth until the government demonstrates competent financial management.
  - B. Frustration with Duvalierist holdovers in the government is raising tensions and giving opposition elements political ammunition.
- II. The internal opposition and pressure groups do not have a unified position.
  - A. The Catholic Church--Haiti's only independent, nationwide organization--has pledged support for the new government.
    1. The hierarchy, like the Namphy government, believes the transition to democracy must be preceded by a long educational process.
  - B. Fledgling political parties, on the other hand, have become more active.

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1. Leading oppositionists such as Gregoire Eugene and Hubert DeRouceray have declared their intent to run for President.
2. Still, the parties lack nationwide support and have weak leadership.

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B. The dissolution of the militia will hurt the Haitian military's capabilities to monitor exile activities.

- IV. Cuba has not viewed Haiti as a priority revolutionary target in recent years but may try to take advantage of the situation.

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B. Given the relative inactivity of the PUCH in recent years, it would probably have difficulty mounting substantial operations in Haiti in the near term unless it received considerable external aid.

- V. Libya, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, could get out ahead of Havana in pushing a radical policy.

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TALKING POINTS FOR ADDI  
Situation in South Yemen  
18 February 1986

Pres. Haydar Abu Bakr al-Atta  
Sec. Gen. Ali Salim al-Bidh  
pm Yasin Saad Numan

Since the killing of several Politburo members on 13 January and the brief civil war that followed, the new rulers have sought to consolidate power.

- They have appointed a new cabinet and party leadership, filling vacancies that resulted from the fighting and the expulsion of the supporters of ousted President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani. It appears to lack regional and tribal balance, a factor that could lead to further infighting.
- Some proteges and allies of the old hardliner faction from Lahij Province are in positions of leadership; other ministers appear to be technocrats with little political experience.
- The South Yemeni military played the key role in the fighting that brought the new regime to power, but no military commander has been given an important position in the new government. This could be a divisive factor in the future.
- The regime faces serious problems dealing with a deeply troubled economy and consolidating its control of the countryside.

North Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih has backed Hasani and his supporters since the early days of the fighting. Although he is likely to continue support for Hasani's guerrilla fighters for the time being to keep his options open, Hasani may be a spent force and probably will come to terms with the new government in Aden.

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- Aden may resume its support for subversion in North Yemen, which Hasani had opposed and ultimately halted.
- some apparent moderates are in positions of prominence.

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- Salih has withstood Soviet pressure--including crude threats--to withdraw his support of Hasani and to recognize the Aden government. He has shown considerable fortitude in bucking Moscow when his military is dependent on Soviet military assistance.

Hasani has visited several Arab states that have close ties to Moscow in an attempt to stall their normalization of relations with the new regime in Aden.

- Ethiopia has been one of his strongest supporters.

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SOVA Contribution to ADDI's Briefing for HPSCI

18 February 1986

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South Yemen's Importance to the USSR

Syria is the Soviets' most important client in the Arab world, but South Yemen is their closest. Whereas in Syria, Moscow has a presence throughout the military but almost nowhere else, in South Yemen, the Soviets--along with their East European and Cuban allies--permeate the entire government, party, and military structure. The Soviets have approximately 1500 military and 500 economic advisers and technicians in South Yemen. The USSR is integrally linked--politically, militarily, economically, and ideologically--with the PDRY, the first and only Marxist government in the Arab world. Only one government in the Middle East, Babrak Karmal's regime in Afghanistan, is more dependent on the Soviets for its existence than is South Yemen.

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The Soviets' interests in the PDRY--a dismally poor country of little more than two million people--stem from its Marxist orientation and its strategic location. The Soviets value the PDRY as the only thing they have to show for almost seventy years of trying to foster the growth of Marxist regimes in the Arab world. They promote South Yemen as a model for other Middle Eastern states to follow and work with it to aid leftist movements in the region. Aden is a haven for Middle Eastern Communists, leftist Palestinians, and the remnants of Marxist insurgents who once fought in neighboring Oman and North Yemen.

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South Yemen's location at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean gives it military significance for the Soviet Union.

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13 February 1986

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

ANGOLA

Military Situation

We remain convinced that the Angolan government--with Soviet and Cuban support--will almost certainly launch another major offensive this year aimed at retaking large portions of UNITA's stronghold in southeastern Angola. The timing of the offensive is still uncertain, although it likely will start earlier than last year's offensive that began in July.

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In our view, a conflict of varying intensity will continue throughout much of the year, although Luanda likely will wait at least until the current rainy season ends in April before throwing its full weight into the offensive.

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Savimbi recognizes that he is on the defensive in southeastern Angola, but, in our judgment, he is far from beaten and remains confident and realistic about his staying power as a major threat to the Luanda regime.

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- Meanwhile, UNITA guerrillas are maintaining the pressure on government outposts, transportation links, and economic targets in northwestern Angola. We expect the insurgents will keep up the pressure in the north despite the threat to their southeastern stronghold.

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[redacted]

In our judgment, the fighting this year will yield only marginal gains for either side. [redacted] neither party expects to deliver or receive a knockout punch and both anticipate a protracted war.

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- Savimbi, in our view will draw a lesson from the fighting last year and rely less on fighting conventional battles to counter the heavier armed government forces. This may mean that UNITA will have to give some ground, possibly including Mavinga, to avoid a costly conventional battle.
- Even if Savimbi were to lose substantial territory to the government troops, we do not believe that it would be fatal to his movement or end the civil war.

#### Savimbi's Travels and Efforts

UNITA leader Savimbi now is in Kinshasa en route to his headquarters in Jamba in southeastern Angola.

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[redacted] We do not  
anticipate that recent US expressions of support for Savimbi will result in new and open assistance for UNITA from Western or African states. The French press [redacted] suggest that Savimbi may visit Western Europe later this year.

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- [redacted]
- Savimbi may also obtain some assistance from conservative, state-level politicians in West Germany like Franz Josef Strauss, who is rumored to have aided him in the past. Meanwhile, meetings of the Frontline states and OAU scheduled for later this month will provide African leaders another opportunity to criticize the US for hosting Savimbi and to affirm support for the MPLA government in Luanda.
  - We expect no more than a handful of African states to join Gabon and Ivory Coast in expressing quiet sympathy for Savimbi and few--if any--to follow Zaire in providing behind-the-scenes assistance to Savimbi.

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13 February 1986

Talking Points for the DCISouth Africa

President Botha's 31 January speech to Parliament, followed by an unprecedented television address to the nation's blacks, made some headway with domestic opponents, but the momentum for the government's reform program soon dissipated.

- Botha publicly reaffirmed last week that separate schools and housing for whites must be retained within the reform framework; also reprimanded Foreign Minister Pik Botha for stating that South Africa could someday have a black-president.
- Chief Buthelezi at first expressed interest in Botha's proposed statutory council that would include blacks and advise the government on constitutional changes but spurned participation following Botha's more recent statements on the limits of reform.
- The government has stated that it will move boldly in the next few months toward more reforms, but most blacks remain cynical about government proposals because of Pretoria's past record of unfilled promises; imminent release of Nelson Mandela unlikely despite persistent rumors but possible later in the year.

Township unrest likely to continue throughout the year.

- Major confrontations between police and blacks have declined since peak levels last fall but violence continues.
- Security officials concerned violence will not abate for long because of developing revolutionary fervor, especially among young blacks.
- Suspension of consumer and school boycotts helped reduce township violence but could resurge if government does not meet specific demands by 31 March.

Increased ANC activity linked in part to growing number of internal recruits; however, the group is unlikely to develop an effective network inside the country soon because of heightend security effort.

- Insurgent incidents in 1985 increased by over 200% from 1984; government notes growth in "serious" incidents involving landmines and attacks on "soft targets" such as the December blast in a shopping center that killed five whites.
- Pretoria's pressure on neighboring countries probably will lead the ANC to rely more heavily on inexperienced recruits within South Africa.
- Nevertheless, the ANC's popularity among blacks is undiminished; contacts by business and religious groups will continue to enhance its prestige.

Modest economic recovery will provide little relief to blacks.

- Growth in 1986 probably will be 3 to 4%; economy needs at least 5% growth rate just to absorb new black entrants to job market; black unemployment above 25%.
- Record-high inflation of 18% has eroded consumer buying power as wages lag behind inflation.
- An agreement may be reached in next few months on rescheduling \$14 billion in frozen foreign debts, but country will remain vulnerable to further debt crises as long as unrest continues.